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WJRIN V. PARKER

fL. A. No. 24053. In Bank.

[48 C.2d

Aug. 6, 1957.]

A. L. WIRIN, Appellant, v. WILLIAM H. PARKER, as
Chief of Police, etc., Respondent.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Use of Dictographs.-Where a city
chief of police authorized and directed the installation, maintenance or use of dictographs by regular salaried police offieers
in a house, apartment, room, offiee, store, bar, jail eell, or other
place of oecupancy, either without the consent, knowledge,
permission or authority of some person having a property interest in such property or plaee, or without the knowledge,
consent, permission or authority of some person present during
such installation, or during such maintenance or during such
use, he authorized and directed dictograph surveillance in
violation of U.S. Const., 4th and 14th Amendments, and Cal.
Const., art. I, § 19.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction
Against illegal Expenditures.-Under Code Civ. Pree., § 526a,
providing that a mnnicipal taxpayer may maintain an action
to restrain the expenditure of public funds for illegal purposes,
it is immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is
small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving
of tax funds.
[3] Public Officers-Duties.-Public officials must themselves obey
the law.
[4] Municipa.! Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction
Against illegal Expenditures.-Expediency cannot justify the
denial of an injunction against the expenditure of public funds
in violation of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures and invasion of privacy.
[6] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction Against mega.! Expenditures.-An injunction against the expenditure of publics
funds to defray the cost of entry into or upon private premises without the consent of a possessor thereof for the purpose
of secreting a microphone or other sound transmission equipment secretly to overhear or record sounds coming therefrom
could be. understood and obeyed and would not inhibit lawful
police activity.
[1] See Ca.!.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et Beq.; Am.J'ur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[2] See Ca.1.J'ur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 555.
McK. Dig. Referencea-: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2, 4:-8]
Municipal Corporations, § 478; [3] Publie Officers, 150.

Aug. 1957]

WIRIN tt. PARKER

891

(48 C.2d 890; 313 P.2d 8441

[6] Id.-Remedies of Ta.xpayers--Injunction Against nlegaJ Expenditures.-In an action by a municipal taxpayer against the
tlhief of police to enjoin illegal expenditure of public funds
to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones (Code Civ. Proe., § 526a), where the evidence and defendant's pleading were to the effect that defendant intended
to continue the illegal conduct, if an injunction be denied on the
defendant's assertion that there is no threat of future illegal
expenditures, plaintiff is entitled to a reversal in order to meet
that issue and secure a clear finding thereon.

APPEAL from 8 judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin chief of police from expending public
funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed
microphones. Judgment for defendant reversed.
A. L. Wirin, in pro. per., Fred Okrand and Nathan L.
Schoichet for Appellant.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke
Jones, Alan G. Campbell and James A. Doherty, Assistant
City Attorneys, and Ralph J. Eubank, Deputy City Attorney.
for Respondent.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintifi', a resident citizen taxpayer of
the City of Los Angeles, brought this action against defendant as chief of police of the city to enjoin the alleged illegal
expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance
by means of concealed microphones. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)
Pursuant to stipulation the matter was submitted on the
pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. The trial court made
findings of fact and conClusions of law and entered judgment
for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff contends that undisputed facts found by the trial
court establish his right to injunctive relief. The trial court
found that" Since his appointment and qualification as Chief
of Police of the City of Los Angeles, the defendant in such
capacity has authorized and directed the installation, maintenance and use of diSltographs by regular salaried police officers
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of the Los Angeles Pol icc Department, but only when in
his sole discretion such use and installation has been necessary in the performance of their duties in detecting crimi"'
and in the apprehension of criminals. In so doing defendant
has acted in good faith and has in good faith believed that
he was acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties."
Acts authorized by defendant have "embraced the following: 1. The concealmcnt by a police officer in the place concerned of a microphone, or other sound transmission device,
in such manner that it may receive sounds within the range
of its capabilities. 2. The provision of means whereby sounds
received by such microphones are transmitted to a place where
a police officer may and does hear and record such sounds.
The defendant has not authorized or directed any dictograph
installation, nor has any police officer of the City of Los
Angeles, acting pursuant to the authorization or direction
of defendant, installed, maintained or used any dictograph
installation, except where the defendant and such officers
had at all times reasonable caUSe to believe that persons under
surveillanlle by such means had committed crimes or planned
and intended the commission of crimes, or that information
thus obtained would aid in the detection or prevention of
crime, or that information thus obtained would assist in
the apprehension of fugitives or other criminals. In one or
more of such instances, but not in all of them, the installation, maintenance or use of dictographs by regular salaried
police officers .•• , pursuant to the authorization and direction of the defendant, have been in a house, apartment, room,
office, store, bar, jail cell, or other place of occupancy, either
without the consent, knowledge, permission or authority of
some person having a property interest in such property or
place, or without the knowledge, consent, permission or authority of some person present during such installation, or
during such maintenance or during such use. The installation, maintenance or use of dictograph equipment without
the knowledge, consent, permission or authority of each such
person has been effected only where the defendant and such
police officers, acting pursuant to the authorization or direction of defendant, believed in good faith and upon probable
cause that knowledge of the surveillance on the part of such
person would destroy the value and purpose of such installation. " The court a~o found that dictograph surveillance
as authorized and directed by defendant was necessary for
the prevention or' punishment of certain felonies and aia-
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demeanors, and that although funds "of the City of Los
Angeles have been expended by defendant to defray the cost
of the equipment and of the personnel time" involved, the
"amount of such expenditures is neither large nor substantial, and the use of such means of necessary surveillance
reduces the cost of the police work involved below what would
be required in efforts to achieve similar purposes by other
means. As of July 2, 1952, the date on which the answer of
the defendant to the amended complaint was filed, the defendant was continuing, and proposed and intended thereafter
to continue, the authorization and direction of such uses of
sound transmission equipment by regular salaried police
officers of the City of Los Angeles when the installation,
maintenance and use of such equipment should be necessary
in his sole discretion in the performance of the duties of the
defendant and of such officers in preventing and detecting
crime and in the apprehension of criminals. • . . There is
no threatened or actual irreparable injury to the plaintiff or to
any other taxpayer, or to the general public of the City of
Los Angeles, by any substantial waste of funds of the said
city in connection with the installation, maintenance or use
of dictograph equipment as described herein. There is no
impending or threatened injury to the plaintiff or to any taxpayer or to the general public of the City of Los Angeles by
reason of any future or threatened authorization in such
connection by the defendant or by reason of any future or
threatened installation, maintenance or use of dictograph
equipment by any police officer of the Los Angeles Police
department acting pursuant to such future or threatened
authorization. "
[1] It is clear from the finding that "In one or more of
such instances, but not in all of them, the installation, maintenance or use of dictographs by regular salaried police officers .•• , have been in a house, apartment, room, office,
store, bar, jail cell, or other place of occupancy, either without
the consent, knowledge, permission or authority of some person
having a property interest in such property or place, or
without the knowledge, consent, permission or authority of
some person present during such installation, or during such
maintenance or during such use," that defendant has authorized and directed dictograph surveillance in violation of
the provisions of the United States Constitution (4th and 14th
Amendments) ~nd the California Constitution (art. I, § 19;
I.-viM T. California, 347 U.S. 128 (74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed.
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561]; People v. Cahan,« Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]; People
v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505]), and that as of
July 2, 1952, he intended to continue so doing. Moreover,
it appears from his answer and evidenee before the trial court
that at least before the decision in the Irvine ease in 1954,
defendant took the position that all of his activities in this
respect were lawful, and he candidly alleged in his answer
that the consent of the "owner, oecupant,or lessee of the
premises" upon which installations were made was not sought
or obtained "when there is reason to believe that ••• knowledge on the part of such person mayor will destroy the
value of an installation as an aid in the apprehension of criminals and the prevention or detection of crime."
[2] The Code of Civil Procedure, section 526a, provides
that plaintiff may maintain an action to restrain the expenditure of public funds for illegal purposes. It is immaterial
that the amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that
the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds.
(Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 279-280 [257 P. 530]; Crowe
v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 121 [193 P. 111]; Osburn v. 8tone, 170
Cal. 480,484 [150 P. 367]; Santa Rosa Lighting Co. v. Woodward, 119 Cal. 30, 34 [50 P. 1025] ; Barry v. Goad, 89 Cal. 215,
222-223 [26 P. 785] ; Winn v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 631, 637 [25 P.
968] ; Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 208 [300 P.2d
119] ; Trickey v. Oity of Long Beach, 101 Ca1.App.2d 871, 881
[226 P.2d 694]; Winn v. Horrall, 85 Cal.App.2d 497,504-506
[193 P.2d 470] ; Brown v. Boyd, 33 Cal.App.2d 416, 418 [91
P.2d 926] ; see Simpson v. Oity of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271,
276 [253 P.2d 464].) [3] It is elementary that public officials
must themselves obey the law. [4] It has been expressly held in
this state that expediency cannot justify the denial of an injunction against the expenditure of public funds in violation of
the constitutional guarantees here involved. (Win'll v. Horrall,
s'U,pra, 85 Cal.App.2d 497, 504.506.) It bears emphasis that
none of the arguments marshalled in People v. Cahan, supra,
44 Ca1.2d 434, against the adoption of the exclusionary rule
are here applicable. Plaintiff seeks to enforce directly the
constitutional provisions to preclude the problem of the Cahan
case. Indeed, the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment by
contempt proceedings against overzealous officers was advo·
cated as an alternative to the exclusionary rule by one of its
ablest and severest critics (see 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d
ed.] § 2184, p. 40).,1lDd the dissenting opinion in the Cahan
case stressed the argumentE for a direct rather than indirect
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method of enforcing the constitutional guarantees that would
not deprive H 'society of its remedy against one lawbreaker
because he has been pursued by another.'" (44 OaL2d 434,
458.)
Defendant nevertheless contends that the scope of the
constitutional prohibitions is so uncertain that an injunction
against their violation would either be too vague to be enforced or would operate to deter the police from permissible
and essential activity for fear of transgressing its limits. He
also contends that the court cannot determine in advance
the reasonableness of police surveillance, which turns on the
facts of the particular case. Plaintiff, however, does not seek
an injunction against all unconstitutional police activities,
nOr does he ask the court to define in advance precisely what
defendant could or could not do in all contingencies. His
primary concern is to prevent repetitions of police conduct
held to fall clearly within the constitutional prohibitions in
the Irvine, Oahan, and Tarantino cases. Whether or not
there may be other circumstances in which eavesdropping by
the use of concealed microphones to record private conversations is violative of the constitutional guarantees, the conduct
condemned in those cases is easily defined. Defendant himself
now contends that he is complying with. those decisions.
[5] An injunction against the expenditure of public funds
to defray the cost of the entry into or upon private premises
without the consent of a possessor thereof for the purpose
of secreting a microphone or other sound transmission equipment secretly to overhear or record sounds coming therefrom
could easily be understood and obeyed and would in no way
inhibit lawful police activity.
[6] Since the court found that in the past defendant
believed in good faith that he was acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties, and since he now states in his
brief that he is complying with the rule of the Irvine case,
he contends that we should -assume that he will not engage
in the questioned conduet . and that an injunction is therefore unnecessary. The evidence and defendant's pleading
before the trial court were to the effect, however, that defendant intended to continue the illegal conduct, and although it
related to his intention before the Irvine case was decided,
the matter was not argued or submitted until several months
thereafter. He did not amend his answer or introduce evidence
that his intentions had changed, and the only, finding with
respect to his intentions was that as of July 2, 1952, prior
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to the Irvine decision, he intended to continue to engage in
constitutionally prohibited conduct. Under these circumsta.nces, if an injunction is to be denied on the ground that
there is no threat of future illegal expenditures, plaintiff is
entitled to meet that issue and secure a clear finding thereon.
(Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Ca1.2d 818,830 [151 P.2d 260] ; see
Sacre v. Ohalupnik, 188 Cal. 386, 390 [205 P. 449].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
SHENK, J.-I dissent.
Under the guise of protecting the public treasury the plaintiff would prevent the purchase of equipment which may be
used for a lawful purpose. Assuming that it might be used
also for an unlawful purpose it is neverthele::.s in the same
category as firearms which may be so used but whose employment in the enforcement of the law is absolutely essential.
It is cOll(,eded by the majority that the plaintiff's primary
concern is to prevent repetitions of police conduct held to
fall within the constitutional prohibitions in the Irvine (Irvine
v. OaJ,ifornia, 347 U.S. 128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561]),
Cahan (People v. Oahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]) and
Tarantino (People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505] )
cases. Such a sweeping injunction is beyond the power of a
court to impose and constitutes an attempt by judicial action
to impose restraints on other branches of the government in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
It is provided by statute that an injunction will not lie
to "prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of
the law for the public benefit." (Code Civ. Proc., § 526,
subd. 4 j see also Civ. Code, § 3423.) Certainly the execution
of the statutes embodied in the Penal Code is "for the public
benefit. "
Furthermore, even if an injunction would lie to accomplish
the purpose sought by the plaintiff nothing in the present
record justifies a determination that there is a threat that
the defendant chief of police is now engaged, or will engage,
in any unlawful activity. At all stages in this proceeding
he has made it clearly understood that he has intended and
intends to comply with the law. The plaintiff concedes that
the chief has acted at all times in good faith in this respect.
The record IihQwi that the type of microphone installations
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held to be illegal in the Irvine and Cahan cases were utilized
by the ehief only prior to those decisions and at a time when
such installations were held by our courts to be proper means
of police detection. It was not until almost two years after
the filing of his answer in this case that the decision in the
Irvine case for the first time put him on notice that such conduct might be improper. The defendant asserts, without
contradiction, that he has not since that time employed such
devices in a prohibited fashion. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that he will not comply with the law. The
court should give consideration to his conceded good faith.
Until a specific violation is threatened there is no reason for
court relief. Here there is no such threat. Indeed, the defendant has consistently asserted that he intends to comply
with the law as the courts have interpreted it.
Also there is no question, and the opinion 80 concedes,
that lawful police activity should not fall within the scope
of the injunctive restraint sought to be imposed. It is not
disputed that lawful police measures may often involve the
use of microphonic equipment and recording devices. To
issue an injunction in the present case would impose on the
defendant the unreasonable burden of determining at his
peril whether the use of such equipment in any situation
would be violative of the restraining order. The existence of
such a restraint certainly would constitute an undue inter.
ference with the duties of a public official sworn to uphold
and enforce the law. I would affirm the judgment.
Spence, J., eoncurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
4, 1957. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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